At the first metres of the marathon: How not to get stuck halfway to the european union

The opening of the first negotiating cluster, “Fundamentals”, signalled the official launch of real negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. But this is only the beginning of our European integration marathon, not the final stretch. Everything is just starting.

Ukraine and the EU are moving from the stage of political declarations and technical preparation to the stage of systematic work aimed at meeting the criteria and standards of membership. The question is no longer only whether Ukraine adopts the right laws that correspond to the spirit and letter of EU standards and criteria. The key question will be different: how effectively and properly these laws are implemented, how institutions function, whether public policy is sustainable, and whether the state is capable of acting according to EU rules both in times of war and in times of peace.

After the opening of Cluster 1, the next logic of the process is as follows: Ukraine must implement roadmaps and interim benchmarks in the areas of the rule of law, democratic institutions, public administration, the judiciary, anti-corruption policy, public procurement, financial control and statistics. These interim benchmarks have been officially handed over to the Ukrainian side, and Ukraine’s progress will be measured by their implementation not only in the “Fundamentals” cluster, but also across all other negotiating clusters.

The particular feature of the first, so to speak, “democratic” cluster is that it is opened first and closed last. The essence of this approach is that a candidate country must demonstrate effective adherence to democratic standards throughout the entire negotiation process. Since accession negotiations traditionally last longer than one electoral cycle in a candidate country, this is also a test of the continuity of the democratic system. In other words, the EU will assess whether commitment to the European goal depends on the personality of a particular president or a particular parliamentary majority, or whether it is truly a national platform.

It is expected that in the near future, possibly as early as July, the remaining five negotiating clusters may also be opened: the internal market, competitiveness, the green transformation, resources and agriculture, and external relations.

The pace of negotiations will primarily depend on the dynamics of Ukraine’s reform implementation, both at the legislative and implementation levels. Implementation, not merely the adoption of laws, will be the key criterion. One example is the Lviv Declaration by Kachka and Kos, adopted in December 2025, which identified ten priority reforms in the areas of the rule of law and democratic institutions. Over more than half a year, Ukraine has managed to fulfil only a limited part of these commitments, and even that with significant political leniency from partners. Instead of doing what is necessary and moving forward, the Ukrainian side has often loudly demanded membership as early as 1 January 2027, arguing that this is justified by the war. But political and psychological blackmail is a flawed strategy on the path to EU membership. Such an approach reveals a dangerous misunderstanding of the essence of the negotiations: we perceive them as fulfilling the wishes of the EU, rather than as a programme of necessary transformations in Ukrainian society, economy and politics.

Ukraine’s membership in the EU is, first and foremost, about reforms in Ukraine, not merely about political decisions in European capitals. Reforms alone do not guarantee an automatic political decision, but a political decision cannot either substitute for reforms or emerge at all without them. Therefore, this process is interconnected and interdependent: Ukraine must demonstrate the quality of change, while the EU must show political readiness to respond to that progress.

The accession negotiation process must be based on several principles.

The first is “merit-based progress”, meaning that the dynamics of the negotiations must depend on Ukraine’s real achievements in meeting the benchmarks.

The second is inclusiveness. European integration is not the project of one party or one government; it is a national platform for transformation that must involve all political forces, civil society, business, the expert community, local self-government and citizens.

The third is the readiness of the EU itself to accept new member states. That is why, in parallel with Ukrainian reforms, the discussion on the reform of the European Union must also be intensified.

The main risks to Ukraine’s progress towards membership can be broadly divided into internal and external ones. On the Ukrainian side, one of the key risks is the absence of internal political unity, which may undermine the effectiveness of legislative work and the implementation of European standards. European integration legislation must be protected as much as possible from political manipulation. It must stand above domestic political competition and must not be turned into an instrument of political struggle.

Another serious risk is a lack of integrity in relation to the European integration process itself. If decisions that in fact contradict European principles are pushed through under European slogans, this will quickly destroy partners’ trust. The EU will assess not only the formal compliance of laws, but also the political context of their adoption, the quality of procedures, inclusiveness and their real impact on institutions.

A separate challenge is insufficient information and explanatory work with Ukrainian business and civil society. European integration cannot be a closed bureaucratic process. People and businesses must understand what exactly is changing, what benefits it brings, what risks arise and how to make the most effective use of new opportunities. Without such communication, even the right reforms may face misunderstanding, resistance or fatigue.

The devastating consequences of the war cannot be ignored either. They will require significant financial, administrative and time resources in order to bring infrastructure, the economy, social systems and public administration to a level acceptable for membership. But the war cannot be a universal explanation for failure to implement reforms. On the contrary, it makes high-quality institutions even more necessary.

On the EU side, the main risk is the unreformed nature of the Union itself. Ukraine is a large country in terms of territory, population, agricultural potential and security significance. Its accession will inevitably affect the EU budget, agricultural policy, cohesion funds, the balance of votes, institutional architecture and mechanisms to protect against democratic backsliding by new members. If the EU does not move forward with its own reform, this may become an objective obstacle to Ukraine’s accession.

The second external risk is the veto power of individual member states. The enlargement process remains politically sensitive, and individual countries may use the negotiations to advance their own interests in bilateral relations. This may concern agriculture, national minorities, economic competition, historical issues or the domestic political agenda within EU countries themselves. Changes of government in key member states may also affect the pace and atmosphere of the negotiations.

There is also another risk that should not be ignored: a potential change in Russia’s position regarding Ukraine’s EU membership. For a long time, Moscow focused on blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership. But given Ukraine’s strategic rapprochement with the EU, it cannot be ruled out that Russia will also try to politically attack the European track. The problem is not that Russia has a formal veto, because it does not. The problem is that some European political forces remain sensitive to Russia’s position and may use it as an argument to slow down Ukraine’s accession.

One should be very cautious about any specific dates for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. The signing of the Accession Treaty is not merely documentary confirmation that Ukraine has fulfilled the necessary criteria and standards. It is a much more complex political and legal process. In fact, the Accession Treaty is a kind of outcome of many years of negotiations. It records not only the candidate country’s readiness for membership and its compliance with the criteria. It also defines transitional periods, special conditions, possible exemptions and safeguards on which individual member states may insist. In other words, it is not only the formalisation of success, but also the formalisation of the compromises that can be reached with all partners in the European Union.

After the negotiations are completed, the consent of the European Parliament, a unanimous decision of the Council of the EU, the signing of the treaty and ratification by all member states and Ukraine are required. This stage alone may add approximately another year and a half to two years. Therefore, a realistic window for the signing and ratification of the Accession Treaty is approximately 2030–2032. A faster scenario would be possible only with a very strong political decision by the EU and an exceptionally high quality of reforms in Ukraine.

A separate risk is an interim format of integration without full membership. Various models of phased integration are already being discussed in the EU: participation in EU programmes and policies, observer status, early access to certain sectors, and participation in security and defence policy without voting rights. These ideas are not negative in themselves. On the contrary, they can give Ukraine practical advantages even before accession.

In this context, it is worth noting the impulse that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has given to discussions in the EU about enlargement and Ukraine’s future membership. It is important that Germany clearly states the ultimate goal: Ukraine’s full membership in the EU, and confirms its readiness to work towards achieving it. But the problem arises when an interim format begins to turn not into an instrument for accelerating accession, but into a substitute for it. Therefore, Ukraine’s position must be very clear: not “associated membership” instead of accession, but accelerated pre-accession integration on the path to full membership. Any interim format must be legally linked to full membership, have clear criteria for moving to the next stage, and include real rights, resources and reform commitments. It must not become a political “ceiling” for Ukraine.

Ukraine must negotiate simultaneously on two levels. Technically, it must meet the criteria as quickly and as effectively as possible. Politically, it must not allow the EU to replace the prospect of full membership with an interim construction that is comfortable for itself, while also building complex, multilayered compromises with European capitals.

Overall, today we should think not only about when we will cross the finish line, or whether we might get stuck somewhere halfway. We must think about how to cover each next kilometre of this path with quality and without losing Ukraine’s long-term interests. Then EU accession will become a true historic victory for Ukraine.