What Keeps Ukrainians In Poland—And What Could Drive Them Away

The tone of the conversation about Ukrainians in Poland has shifted noticeably in recent weeks. On top of the deterioration in Polish-Ukrainian relations have come high-profile cases of physical violence, harsher statements from politicians, debate about scaling back support and proposals to deport particular categories of Ukrainian citizens. Polish police figures show that Ukrainians reported 180 hate crimes in the first half of 2026—30 percent more than a year earlier. After a series of attacks at the end of July, Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly called for an end to xenophobic violence. What matters more, though, is how the worsening public mood will affect actual migration decisions.

Against this background, the latest figures from Eurostat are telling. As of 30 June 2026, Poland was home to 961,170 people from Ukraine under temporary protection—21.8 percent of all such beneficiaries in the EU. Over the month their number fell by 6,335, or 0.7 percent, making it the largest absolute decrease of any country in the European Union. And it happened before the most notorious of the July attacks on Ukrainians. So does this mean Ukrainians have already begun leaving Poland en masse, planning to return home or move on to another European country? And, more importantly, could the current deterioration in relations and in the public mood speed that process up?

Two-thirds see their future in Poland

The most detailed picture of how Ukrainians in Poland are rethinking their plans comes from a survey by the Center of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, conducted in March and April 2026 among 1,892 Ukrainian citizens. Among war refugees, 45.9 percent planned to stay in Poland for another few years, 19 percent spoke of settling permanently, 24.6 percent did not know how much longer they would stay, and around 9.5 percent planned to leave before the end of the year. So even prior to the latest wave of attacks, roughly two-thirds of war refugees were already set on a long-term or permanent life in Poland, almost one in four had no firm plan, and about one in ten was contemplating an early departure.

Ask not how long they intend to stay but which country they see themselves living in, and the picture is much the same. The said study found that 54.9 percent of war refugees saw their future entirely in Poland, 14.5 percent would like to divide their lives between Poland and Ukraine, 9.1 percent saw their future in Ukraine, 4.2 percent—in another country, and 15.1 percent had yet to make up their minds. These figures need to be read alongside a study by Gradus Research among Ukrainian migrants in EU countries in May 2026. There, 53 percent said they were in principle considering a return to Ukraine, but two-thirds of them could not name a date, and only 4 percent planned to return during 2026. What this shows is that a person can want to go back one day and still plan to spend several more years in Poland. Declarations about returning cannot, therefore, be converted automatically into a forecast of actual outflow.

The attacks have changed the climate

As yet, there is no representative survey of Ukrainians in Poland carried out after the high-profile July attacks that would measure the shift in migration plans directly. But it is already clear that the political and social context in which those decisions will be made has changed. What matters to a Ukrainian is not only the risk of being physically attacked. It matters just as much whether the environment will still be predictable in three or five years, and whether today’s campaign rhetoric will become tomorrow’s state policy. A qualitative study by the Krytyka Polityczna Institute, Nie jesteśmy w domu (“We Are Not at Home”), shows that the worsening atmosphere is already affecting behavior even among those with no direct experience of aggression. Some of those interviewed spoke of using Ukrainian more cautiously in public, and of a general sense that they remain “not at home” regardless.

An even more important finding of that study is that it is not only the least integrated who are thinking about moving on. Among those weighing a move further west or a return to Ukraine were people with substantial human capital: languages, professional qualifications and wide options on the European labor market. That demolishes the simple assumption that the first to leave will be those who never learned Polish and never found work. The poorly integrated are indeed mobile because they have less to leave behind. But the well integrated and well qualified can be just as mobile since they have more alternatives.

Why most will stay anyway

Over four years, a large share of Ukrainian refugees has embedded itself deeply in Polish life. At the end of 2025, there were 857,000 Ukrainian citizens registered with ZUS, the Polish social insurance institution. According to figures from the Polish Economic Institute, Ukrainians registered 109,100 sole proprietorships between 2022 and 2025, plus another 14,500 companies with Ukrainian capital. In 2025 Ukrainian citizens bought some 9,000 flats, and tens of thousands of Ukrainian children are studying in Polish schools. This is not how a temporary group behaves: a job, a home, a school for the children, the language and a network of social ties sharply raise the cost of moving again. That is precisely why the current wave of attacks is unlikely to trigger a sudden mass exodus. The more realistic scenario is that some people will stay in Poland physically but will start investing less in their future here. One will not buy the flat; another will not bring the family over; a third will start looking harder at vacancies in Germany or the Netherlands.

It is worth coming back here to the Eurostat figures. They do not mean that 6,335 Ukrainians physically left Poland in June; they point only to a fall in the number of people holding temporary protection. The direction of travel is nonetheless worth noting. The available sociology allows only a rough sketch of what Ukrainians in Poland will do. Around 60–70 percent of war refugees will most likely stay here for at least the next few years. Some 5–10 percent may return to Ukraine, and another 5–10 percent may move to other EU countries. Around 15–20 percent are undecided. Importantly, leaving Poland by no means implies an automatic return to Ukraine. According to the University of Warsaw, among those already planning to leave Poland in the near future, 44 percent had no idea where they would go, and only about a quarter were set on returning home for good.

Ukrainians are now a structural part of the Polish economy

The potential economic consequences of an outflow are better assessed not by trying to guess how much exactly Poland stands to lose. It is far more reliable to look at what the country already gains today from the presence of Ukrainians. According to the latest figures from Statistics Poland, 769,300 Ukrainian citizens were working here at the end of February 2026, 8.5 percent more than a year earlier. Ukrainians made up almost 68 percent of all foreign nationals in employment. So even against a certain decline in the number of temporary protection holders, the number of economically active Ukrainians is rising.

The second level is the contribution to GDP. The most recent full macroeconomic assessment by Deloitte for the UNHCR shows that the presence of Ukrainian war refugees specifically raised Poland’s real GDP in 2024 by roughly 2.7 percent, or almost 99 billion zlotys, compared with a scenario without this group. And the effect grew as integration progressed. In 2022, it was put at 1.5 percent of GDP, in 2023—at 2.3 percent, and in 2024—at 2.7 percent.

A separate calculation by the National Bank of Poland (NBP) confirms how much Ukrainian labor is worth. In 2021–2023, the work of war refugees delivered on average around 0.8 percentage points of Poland’s annual GDP growth, or roughly 29 percent of all economic growth over that period.

On the same Deloitte model, the presence of Ukrainian refugees increased the revenues of Poland’s general government sector in 2024 by around 47 billion zlotys. A debate that treats Ukrainians purely as recipients of social benefits therefore fits economic reality less and less. Then there is entrepreneurship. According to the Polish Economic Institute, between 2022 and 2025 Ukrainians registered 109,100 sole proprietorships and around 14,500 companies with Ukrainian capital. By the end of 2025 almost 27,000 such companies were operating in Poland. Ukrainians, in other words, are not merely filling vacancies; they are creating economic activity themselves.

There is one further asset that current GDP captures only in part: children and skilled workers. According to figures from the Supreme Audit Office, 165,815 Ukrainian refugee pupils were in the Polish education system in the 2025/26 school year. They are already learning Polish, following the Polish curriculum and building social ties. Between 2022 and the end of March 2025, additional spending on educating children from Ukraine exceeded 7.8 billion zlotys. If these families stay, a large share of those children will within a few years enter Polish universities and the Polish labour market with virtually none of the adaptation costs that migration normally entails. If they leave, part of the future return on investment already made will be reaped by another country.

The picture is similar with another group: skilled adults. According to NBP figures for 2025, about a third of war refugees felt they were working below their qualifications in Poland. That means the present economic contribution of Ukrainians does not yet show their full potential. As their language improves, their diplomas are recognized and they move into work that matches their skills, their productivity and their tax contribution can rise further.

And that is where the paradox of the present moment lies. Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is growing louder at precisely the moment when the integration of Ukrainians is paying Poland ever larger dividends. The country has already gained hundreds of thousands of workers and entrepreneurs, tax revenue, children in its education system and qualified people whose potential is far from exhausted. All of this took years to build, and part of that capital can be lost far faster. If short-term political competition on anti-Ukrainian ground begins to drive away workers, entrepreneurs and professionals who are already integrated, the main beneficiaries could be other EU countries. They will acquire ready-made human capital, while the most expensive first stage of building it has largely already taken place in Poland.

In the end, though, it will not be political declarations that decide this, but Ukrainians themselves. And the choice will be a highly pragmatic one because people vote with their wallets, their safety and their children’s prospects. If Poland goes on offering a decent living, a sense of safety and the ability to plan ahead, most will stay. If those three things start to deteriorate, the mere fact of several years spent in Poland will no longer be convincing enough. Because the question, for a great many Ukrainians, is no longer “Poland or Ukraine?” but “Where will my family and I have a better life over the next ten years?”